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The actual amount of work done and the quality of life 
on the plantation was the result of a compromise between 
masters and slaves ... The role of the driver was to 
minimize the friction by mediating between the Big House 
and the quarters. On the one hand he was the masterls 
man: he obeyed orders, inflicted punishments, and stood 
for authority and discipline. On the other hand, he 
could and did tell the master that the overseer was too 
harsh, too irregular ... The slaves generally knew just 
how much they had to put up with ... The driver was their 
voice in the Big House as well as the masterls voice in 
the quarters. 
(E. Genovese, In Red and  lack) 
Between about 1890 and 1910, the form and content of the Capers colonial rule over the 
l 
Transkei altered in a number of ways. With territorial consolidation came efforts at 
I codification and uniformity. Zealous administrative routines were promulgated; a 
I host of decrees touched on the control of diseases, on the eradication of pests and 
l 
I weeds, on the movement of persons and property, on access to forests and fields. Under 
the Glen Grey Act taxes were raised, a more elaborate local bureaucracy created, and 
~ 
I the development of an infrastructure accelerated. Central to a pattern of expanding 
l 
magisterial authority was the role of the headman. Headmen bore the brunt of 
, substantial increases in police work, taxation, and court hearings, while the -tic 
I rise in labour recruitment owed much to the function of headmen as (official and 
unofficial) recruiters. Emphasis on the headmen as f orning the "front-line echelons 
of the Transkeian administration1' (1) should not obscure what was a profoundly 
contradictory relationship. 
At the same time that headmen served the Cape colonial officials, they 
engqpd in an intricate and &fold struggle with them over the distribution of local 
social and political power. As government servants, headmen had to enforce observance 
of new laws and to insist on levies of cash, produce, or labour-power. As leading men 
in their locations, headmen had also to be able to reward their followers, to respond 
to popular pressures, and to mediate between magistrate and commoner. This paper seeks 
to reconstruct the career of one headman. It is not argued that Enoch Mamba was a 
llty-picalll headman. He was more ambitious and more successful than all but a handful 
of his peers, and by the time of Union had achieved some prominence as a member of 
the Cape's educated black political class. It is postulated that his career 
abundantly demonstrates the possibilities and contradictions with the post of headman. 
(i) Mamba emergent 
Compared with the three districts of "Fingoland properf1 utterwo worth, 
Nqamakwe and ~somo) which had predominantly Mfengu populations, the district of 
Idutywa was regarded by its magistrates as a more vexing consulship. As well as 
Mfengu immigrants,Idutywa received large numbers of Gcaleka and Ndlambe refugees after 
the 1856-7 Cattle Killing. By 1891, of a population of 27,000 in Idutywa, 37% were 
Mfengu and 60% Gcaleka and Ndlambe, divided roughly equally between these latter. 
Local administration was frequently conceived of in terns of "balancing the 
nationalitiesll: successive magistrates all sought to control these potentially 
quarrelsome communities, but pursued this policy with very different divisions of force 
and favour. 
For a quarter of a century, the pivotal individual in the district was 
undoubtedly the Gcaleka chief, Sigidi. One of the few Gcaleka leaders not to take 
part in the Cattle Killing, Sigidi accepted a portion of Idutywa Reserve in 1858, in 
exchange for his land (in what became Komgha district) granted to German legionaries. 
He and Smith Umhalla provided a volunteer police force that assisted the Frontier 
Armed and Mounted Police in driving Sarili across the Mbashe and patrolled the Idu- 
Reserve for some yeass; But Sigidils star waned somewhat after the 1877-8 Gcaleka 
War - although he denied then and ever afterwards that his fealty to Government had 
ever wavered. (2) He remained intermittently at odds with the Cape administration 
thereafter, squabbling about status, lands, salary, and his authority over headmen. 
His power stemmed from the loyalty he commanded amongst his followers, and the extent 
to which the headmen under him regarded him as their immediate superior. 
By the early 1890s, the loyalty of his followers and his control over the 
headmen were both subjected to strain. His support was dissipated as his sons jockeyed 
for position in the imminent succession dispute, and one of the responses of the ageing 
chief seems to have been the attempt to exercise ti&ter control over the headmen. 
Certainly, Charles Bell (magistrate of Idutywa 1887-1893) regarded him as too powerful. 
In one of several letters hostile to Sigidi, Bell complained in 1891 that the chief 
was holding secret meetings with his headmen, and called for "serious and prompt 
attention" to Sigidi 1 S llevil influence^^^. Ten years later, another official recalled 
that Sigidi'had insisted that the headmen consult him before they saw the magistrate 
about anything, and that "his interference in the administration ... became so 
objectionable that M r  Charles Bell . . . had to clip his wings ~onsiderably~~. (3)
In the circumstances, Bellls magistracy provided an excellent launching 
platform for the career of an ambitious and talented aide who could be counted on to 
oppose Sigidi. If such an individual already enjoyed the confidence of the magistrate, 
what horizons might not be open? Precisely this was the opportunity afforded Enoch 
Mamba. Born in Fort Beaufort to an unremarkable family of commoners, educated at 
Healdtown until the age of 16, he left the Wesleyan school with the highest teacherls 
qualification then offered by the institution. Tantalisingly, no details have yet 
surfaced of Maa.:bals subsequent private studies; we know merely that they were 
substantial. Mamba's family moved to Idutywa in about 1878, where the young man tau&t 
for three yeas. Then, aged 21 or 22, he was appointed in February 1883 as Interpreter 
and. Assistant Clerk in the magistratels office. 
He served in this capacity for nearly ten years, and was reliable and hard- 
working. In one of several commendations penned by Bell, the magistrate praised his 
"zeal . . . integrity and general good conduct". Mamba had "rendered efficient service 
in the collection of Hut Tax, Registration of Huts, in taking the Census, and in 
managing the Intelligence Department of the office in connection with the natives in 
th is  Districtf1. (4) In effect, Mamba served a form of apprenticeship to the post of 
headman. A s  the reference to "managing the Intelligence Department" indicates, his  
duties included the provision of secret information to the magistrate. By la te  1892, 
Mamba's desire for  promotion and Bell's clash with Sigidi intersected. One of Bellls 
tactics i n  depriving Sigidi of patronage was to replace headmen loyal to the chief - 
on death or dismissal - with magisterial appointees. In August 1893, Sigidi 
complained about the appointment of headmen without his  knowledge, and said they 
refused "to acknowledge mef1. (5) One of these unwelcome newcomers was Mamba. 
1 The new headman addressed himself to his  task with vigour. H i s  f i r s t  three 
years i n  office were notable for  a series of achievements that could only have been 
accomplished by an active or  interventionist version of headmanship. In  August 1895 
Mamba buttressed a claim for  a pay r i se  with the argument that his  location ( ~ o t a  
I location) was the largest i n  Idutywa, and unt i l  recently had been one i n  which thieves 
I and escaped prisoners used to hide. 
Since my appointment, you w i l l  please perceive that 
there i s  less crime committed, the people being 
convinced that whenever an offence was committed, the 
accused parties would be promptly taken to the office 
to be dealt with by the magistrate. (6) 
Moreover, his  location was one i n  which a l l  the Hut Tax had been paid, and "the f i r s t  
to pay the [ ~ l e n    re^] General Rate i n  a large batch". Mamba also started a school i n  
the location and bui l t  a school house. 
Anotherindication of the impact Mamba made was the role he played i n  the 
dis t r ic t ' s  response to the Glen Grey Act (1894). In Idutywa, the i n i t i a l  response was 
one of apprehension and hosti l i ty;  Sigidi, Zenrrile, and other senior chiefs and 
headmen resisted it strongly. A t  a meeting on October 24 1894, W b a  made an ar t ful  
speech, couching pointed criticism of the Act i n  the form of reluctant acquiescence. 
"We accept the law of Government but had it not already been made law we would have 
had certain things to say", he began, and proceeded with detailed criticisms of the 
labour tax and d i s t r i c t  rate. Nevertheless, he added, "some of us are pleased to have 
schoolsll and he called for  greater governmental contributions to aid local education. 
When the assembled headmen - having finally accepted the Act - elected District 
Councillors, Mamba joined Sigidi, Zenrrile, and Matambeko, and a t  subsequent District 
Council meetings he played a forceful role. (7) ' 
A further feature of h is  headmanship i n  the years 1892-5 was Mamba's 
embroilment i n  a series of controversies. Among those that are documented,Mamba was 
variously at odds with a powerful commoner i n  his  location, with a missionary, with a 
trader, and with the magistrate. In  the f i r s t  of these, one Gogushe lodged a 
complaint against the headman and a c iv i l  case was heard i n  the magistratels court i n  
January 1893. Bell, i n  a private l e t t e r  to the Chief Magistrate (CMT) , defended Mamba 
against charges of misdemeanour, and confided that 
Gogushe is the wealthiest man i n  the location and i s  
generally at variance with the Hdman, On this  occasion 
the Headman i s  also wealthy and equal to Gogushe i n  
intelligence; much inclined to require obedience from 
him, which has never been exacted by previous headmen, 
to th is  fact  I attr ibute Gogushecs b i t t e r  feeling ... (8) 
Mamba emerged victorious from the ensuing l i t igation,  as he was also to  do from clashes 
with the Rev. W. S. Davies and the trader D. Venables. He was obviously not only an 
energetic headman but also a determined protitlpnist. In his  next engagement, against 
the most formidable opponent i n  the dis t r ic t ,  he overreached himself and suffered a 
defeat no less devastating for  being his f i r s t .  
(ii) Mamba defeated 
It is not possible to pinpoint the moment at which Mamba and W. T. Brownlee 
(magistrate from early in 1893) first fell into conflict, but it seems that animosity 
of some intensity commenced early on in Brownlee's tenancy of the office. By 1893, 
Brownlee had been in the Cape civil service for 17 years. Upright, deeply moral, and 
occasionally self-righteous, he was something of a martinet, particularly with regard 
to tlimmoralitylf and liquor. His temperance views were obliquely referred to in a 
letter to the Umtata Herald, 13 May 1893, that was mainly concerned Do make a more 
damaging complaint against the new magistrate. Addressed to "The Water Drinker" and 
signed by "Horned Owl", it charged that Brownlee was favouring Sigidi's faction in 
the district. ('There was definitely an element of truth in this. Brownlee's 
successor noted in 1897 that he treated Sigidi with less consideration than Brownlee 
had; Brownlee appointed two of Sigidils sons to positions in the police and goal.) 
In the course of a public hearing in 1896, authorship of two anti-Brownlee letters by 
the Horned Owl was formally attributed to Mamba. 
One suspects that Mamba would have hesitated to wage as public a campaign 
against Brownlee as he did in the closing months of 1895 had not the magistrate's 
position already been made precarious by his feud with a sizeable faction of the 
colonists in the town. Passions ran high during the "great tennis club rown (which 
deserves a full Gilbert and Sullivan setting) - aYld a petition was circulated calling 
for Brownleets removal. By 12 October 1895, the CNT wrote to the Under Secretary for 
Native Affairs (uSNA) about the "very considerable friction" between "WC Brownlee and. 
the people of his district both white and nativet1 and recommended his transfer to 
Kentani. (9) It was against this background that Mamba joined openly in the attempt 
to unseat Brownlee. He organized meetings thro~out the district, and on 22 November 
invited (and secured) the attendance of the CNT at a large meeting. 
Mamba acted as spokesman for the (predominantly ~fengu) headmen and 
commoners pxesent, claiming to represent the views of more than half the headmen of 
the district. The main charge levelled against Brownlee was that his magistracy had 
been divisive: Ndlambe, Gcaleka and Mfengu had "split up, and we do not like each 
other ... We were formerly unanimous as Government told us to agree with each other". 
Secondly, Mamba listed a number of Brownlee's judicial procedures that had caused 
concern: arbitrary fines in adultery cases, failure to consult assessors (i.e. headmen) 
on points of customary law, and so on. Thirdly, a series of administrative objections 
was lodged, centring in particular on the magistrate's handling of the forest 
regulations and his relations with the District Council. Mamba followed up the 
meeting with a cable to Rhodes, the premier, claiming that administration in the 
district was at a point of breakdown because of Brownleets deteriorating; relations 
with the h e a m .  (10) 
Brownlee fo@t back against his removal to Kentani, and against Mamba, now 
clearly defined as his immediate enemy. In a long letter to the CNT, Brownlee 
requested a fair hearing in public: this (he reminded his superior) was a basic right 
of every British subject. Moreover, he argued, the meeting which the C m  had attended 
was a packed one, secretly arranged. 
I can further show [continued ~rownlee] that this 
whole matter is got up by Enoch Mamba, who has gone 
about the district cajoling and intimidating, aYld 
would be deli&ted to see me away from this, as I 
have been trying to curtail the almost unlimited 
power which he has until recently assumed to himself. (11) 
Brownlee carried his case, and in February 1896 a public hearing was presided over by 
W. Cr Scully, magistrate at Nqamakwe. His long report on the hearing is a curious blend 
of formal "judicialt1 impartiality with bias and animus. Although not close 
acquaintances, Brownlee and Scully = brother magistrates; they both held pronounced 
anti-liquor views; and they shared a distaste for "educated Natives". 
Scully took evidence on no fewer than 20 complaints against Brownlee, 
including the Tennis Club issue. In summary, he found that Brownlee was innocent 
of causing dissension between the tribes; that the magistrate had been most 
injudicious in his dealings with the tennis club; that he had made at least one 
"serious mistakeu and comitted "certain irregularities1' in administrative and 
judicial duties; on other judicial and administrative charges, Brownlee was 
exonerated. The magistrate's conduct (found ~cully) had been placed under "a fierce 
and hostile li&tn. 
If however, his brother magistrates (myself included) 
had had an Enoch Mamba with his notebook at their 
respective elbows for several years, and then their 
doing exposed to the sane searching scrutiny, - I 
wonder 'who should Iscape whipping'. 
An attack,on M b a  was, indeed, one of the main features of the report. At various 
points, %ba' S evidence was held to be "inconsis tent", "discrepant", "malicious1', 
ayld "utterly idiotic". The headman was 
an extreme type of a class of Native which forms one 
of the worst of the many questionable products 
generated through our methods of (so called) 
civilizing the Natives. He is a man who, by his own 
admission, leads an evil life; education has 
developed in him a degree of cunning ... and his 
official post gave him opportunities of exercising a 
most evil influence. 
Mamba should be dismissed forthwith as headman: if "headmen be allowed, with impunity, 
to foment agitations against magistrates without adequate cause", the consequences 
would be "most disastroust1. (12) On 7 April 1896, James Rose-Innes in the Native 
Affairs office pronounced Scully's findings "fair and reasonablen and ordered Mamba's 
dismissal. 
Mamba wrote to the CMT and the USNA in June aYld September 1896, protesting 
against his dismissal. He pointed out - correctly - that he had not been on trial; 
aYld requested (just as Brownlee had six months before!) "to have my case tried, so 
that I may be able to bring my own witnesses to exculpate myself" and "defend myself 
like a,ny other civil servant". (13) 
(iii) Mamba resurent 
The last mentioned letters from Mamba came not from Idutywa but from Indwe. 
Mamba lived there until lgOl or 1902, and set himself up as a labour agent. To succeed 
as a licensed labour agent was one of the most lucrative ventures open to an educated 
Transkeian in the nineties. There was a mounting demand for men along the Witwatersrand 
and also (prior to 1904) a great hunger for unskilled hands at the ports and along the 
lines of rail. Labour agents enjoyed rich pickings as they shuttled their consignments 
of work-seekers to a variety of competing employers. While they sometimes received a 
retainer from contractors, essentially they earned by results, being paid an agreed 
sum per head for the workers they secured. 
The indications are that Mamba did well financially out of his recruiting 
work. His profits were great enough to lead him to explore various means of investing 
them. After his return to Idutywa, Mamba applied for an agent's licence in that 
district. Presumably this was not renewed after it expired in December 1903, for by 
1904 Mamba was describing himself as a farmer, and referring in the past tense to his 
labour business. He seems to have paid a good deal of attention to wgricultm on his 
lands, and was a typically "improving" small farmer of the period. At his death, his 
estate included a wagon, a scotch cart, a buggy, three ploughs, two harrows and a 
planter. (14) He did not give up his labour recruiting activities entirely, serving 
as a runner for a number of years and - in 1912 - acting briefly as a salaried recruiter 
with the m. 
Mamba's eight years of (enforced) absence from the headmanship also saw him 
enter politics on a broader stage than that provided by Lota location. In October 
1901, Mamba infomed the magistrate and CMT of the formation of a NativedVigilance 
Association (11iso ~omsi) which intended "looking after the educational and local 
interest of the Transkeian natives generally". Government approval sought by the NVA 
was i n  fact undermined by W b a ' s  reputation, as well as by the CT.ITls suspicions of 
"native politics1f more generally. Despite the skepticism and hostility of the colonial 
officials, Mamba 4 the NVA (of which he was chairman) continued their operations. l 
In 1902-3, Mamba travelled through several distr icts,  setting up branches i n  them; he 
lobbied the General Council, the CMT, and his MM. He summed up the programme of the 
NVA as favouring the "general advancement of civilisationff, parliamentary representation, I 
and "gratifying voters". These aims, Mamba argued, could not be met by magistrates, 
missionazies, nor the Council system: Transkeian rate-payers were ignored in  a way l 
that amounted to "taxation without representationtf. In several communications, he I 
criticized Transkeian headmen: drawn from the "red" or conservative element, they 
"troubled themselves mostly about the enlargement of their own locations and their 
importance". (15) l 
l 
l 
Mamba's exertions certainly kept him visible as a spokesman for educated 
Transkeians, and i n  1903 and 1904 he was invited to give evidence to a Select 
Committee on the Glen Grey Act and to SANAC. He journeyed to Cape Town to address 
the SC on land tenure and t i t l e ,  labour tax, the election of Councils ("the Government 
take it that they represent the people, whereas they only represent the headmen"), and 
criticized the treatment of labourers on the mines. To the SC and S W ,  Mamba pressed 
the claims of his NVA as representing the most progressive African opinion in  the 
Transkei. (16) 
What was happening meanwhile in  Lota location? Mamba's dismissal in  A p r i l  
1896 did not solve the difficulties of Brownlee or his successors. Six months la ter  
a new magistrate ( ~ i t z  b ell) wrote that he had "had considerable difficulty" i n  finding 
a successor to Mamba. Mamba himself had attempted to intervene, proposing his father 
as headman. The eventual appointee soon died, and was succeeded by his son, who i n  
turn was deposed by Bell (on grounds of youth and ill-health) af ter  only seven months. 
In March 1898, an elderly, l i terate  Mfengu was made headman in  Lota: he was Stephen 
Mamba, Enoch's father. In his sixties, Stephen found running a large location an 
arduous task, and he increasingly relied for assistance upon his son. Cumming, who 
became magistrate i n  December 1903, gratefully acknowledged the great assistance in 
administering the location affairs rendered by Mamba fils. In 1904, Mamba wrote a 
series of le t ters  to Cumming, to the CMT, and to the Prime Minister (skilfully 
adjusting his tone and his argument in  each case). He hoped that his earl ier  
transgression had been sufficiently punished; he had never been convicted of any 
crime; and (the main burden of his appeal) he would be of great value to the 
Government. There was not a headman i n  the Transkei with his level of education; he 
commanded a large influence; and he would see that the fu l l  Glen Grey provisions were 
enacted in  Idutywa. (17) In December 1904, Stephen was retired, and Enoch Mamba was 
once win placed on the Government pay-roll as headman. 
(iv) Mamba dominant 
For the next twelve years, Mamba exercised his authority as headman, and 
also established himself as a doughty participant i n  several broader political spheres. 
He served as a District Councillor, and from 1906 unti l  his f inal  illness i n  1916 
represented Idutywa i n  the General Council (~unga). He also became one of the few 
Transkei politicians to attain any status i n  Cape - and la ter  South African - political 
organizations i n  this period. 
In the f i r s t  of these arenas, Lota location, it i s  clear that Mamba was an 
active and even authoritarian figure; that i t s  inhabitants tended to divide between 
his supporters (mainly Mfengu and schooled) and those who perforce obeyed him even 
while they found his rule uncomfortable. He bore down more heavily than most headmen 
on certain I1red" practices, while in the day to day administrative matters he could 
justly claim by 1912 that "the location I managed has been an example of what 
Government requiresf1. (18) He had not been back long in his post before being involved 
in another fierce dispute. The central issue was the control of education, but the 
episode also revealed much about the actual powers wielded by a determined headman. 
A. J. Lemard, missionary at Clarkebury, sought to have Mamba disciplined 
or dismissed after the headman had damaged the local Wesleyan mission effort in its 
most vulnerable area, its educational activities. Disapproving of the local Wesleyan 
teacher, Mamba had opened his own private school, and enrolment in the mission school 
sagged from 50 to only 18. Lennard claimed that Mamba had used intimidation and force 
to prevent attendance at the Wesleyan school. From the welter of complicated and 
contradictory testimonies, the CNT and magistrate found in favour of Mamba. The 
headman was able to remind the enquiry that he had himself opened the Wesleyan school 
a decade before; he effectively criticized the Wesleyan teacher for drunkenness; he 
suggested that a reason for the popularity of his school was that it offered cricket 
(ad obliquely hinted at another drawcard, that he gave some lessons himself!); and 
concluded virtuously "1 never, in any way, tried to get them to go to my private 
school1'. This last was a disingenuous claim. 
Without entering the details of the hearing, one can extract from the 
depositions a number of examples of how Mamba Snduced and influenced parents to change 
schools. Land allocation was always a crucial weapon at the headman's disposal, and 
in at least two cases Mamba confiscated arable land belonging to Wesleyans (citing 
boundary transgressions as the reason). Another vital resource, wood - for fuel, 
buildings, and sledges - could be collected only with a headman's permit, One witness 
said he had sent his children to Mamba's school rather than be deprived "of bushes and 
justice1'. Another lever used by Mamba was the me-book: non-performance by 
commoners of any obligations (the registration of deaths, attendance at meetings) 
could serve to justify punitive actions taken against the families concerned. The 
headman's role as intermediary between magistrate and people was also critical, and 
its withdrawal could be a potent pressure - some who had changed schools reported 
that Mamba had threatened not to support them in civil cases. (19) 
In the District Council, Mamba was without challenge as the dominant local 
politician: he initiated resolutions, scrutinized Bunga and government decisions, and 
swqred debates. His oratorical powers, his grasp of legislative and administrative 
minutiae, and his links with an external constituency also stood him in good stead in 
the Bunga, Here, too, he was a frequent and vigorous debater (so vigorous as once to 
have been described by another Councillor as "a member who when he was speaking 
sometimes threw verbal knobkerries at peopleu). In a number of major debates - over 
the draft Act of Union, over the difficulties caused by East Coast Fever, over the 
outbreak of war - Mamba made the major proposing speeches. His critique of the Act 
of Union was typically cogent and to the point: 
The benefits were obvious so far as the European 
community is concerned. But in regard to the 
Natives, who are at present in possession of equal 
British rights with the white people, the men who 
met together to devise this draft Act have sought 
to tamper with those rights ... This Union Parliament ... 
would provide all legislation for the Territories and 
all taxes - it would be the source of every measure 
affecting the Native people. (20) 
Another striking feature of Mamba's perfo~nances in District and General 
Councils was the strong populist strain that ran through his political efforts. This 
could take m a n y  forms. At one level, it simply meant championing local interests: 
Mamba's campaign to have the "Jubilee Hall" in Idutywa returned to the black community, 
his proposals for greater autonomy for districts vis-&-via the Ihu?ga, and for the 
retention of local funds for local improvements, are exanples. More radically, W b a  
repeatedly took up the position of popular tribune, and defined his own position as a 
representative of the masses: when he called, in 1912, for the free dipping of cattle, 
he said that this was the wish of the people of his district, and that he "voiced the 
opinion of his country and his people". He contrasted the "easy timesl1 and increasing 
salaries of Bunga officials with the mounting depression of the rate-payers. (21) 
In 1903 Mamba had no links with wider Cape politics. Indeed, there was a 
frosty exchange between himself and the South African Native Congress. Its most 
prominent members in 1903 were Rubusana, Javabu and H. K. Soga, and its members 
(clergymen, teachers, farmers) were almost entirely from Kingwilliamstown and East 
London. Mamba complained that they could not understand or represent the pievances 
of the Transkei. But by 1906 the SANC was geographically more broadly based, with 25 
branches thro~~&out the Eastern Cape, including half a dozen Transkei districts, Mamba 
had already joined the SANC by April 1906, when its Queenstown conference elected a 
"standing committee" to speak for it in the prevailing "critical state of native 
affairsv. The members of the committee were A. K. Soga, M. Pelem, Rubusana, Jabavu, 
D. Dwanya, J. M. Mzimba, S. P. Sihlali - and Mamba. A ministerial minute noted that 
these were 
natives who have attained to some prominence in their 
various spheres ... among their number are two newspaper 
editors, three native ministers, a law agent, a 
government headman, and a successful native trader and 
labour agent ... as fairly representative a bow of 
advanced Cape Colony natives as could at present be 
found. (22) 
Henceforth, Mamba was to be an active member of the (cape) SANC and (after 1912) of 
the W C .  He became a frequent delegate on committees and deputations. In 1909 he 
was one of half a dozen Africans nominated at the Bloemfontein conference to address 
the government on African fears about Union. He attended the 1912 Bloemfontein 
conference on an inter-state college; gave evidence in 1911 and 1914 to the SC on the 
Native Labour Bill asld to the Beaumont Commission; in lgll he was a member of a three- 
man commission on the WilhelmstaZ shootine in German SWA. (23) Finally, Mamba was 
a member of the SANNC deputation that saw F. S. Malan in 1913 over the Natives Land 
Bill and other issues. 
This involvement in politics outside the Transkei must have enhanced the 
standing he attained within the Territories. An indication of his drawing power as 
speaker asld politician can be gained from an E report (21 September 1909) of a 
great dinner held by the Nqamakwe Vigilance Association to hear Mamba. A large crowd 
assembled, having come on foot or on horseback, "everybody saying I must be present 
where Mamba isn. Mamba was introduced as an expert on council matters who had the 
reputation of "safeguarding the rights of his [native] people" regardless of what the 
magistrates thought. In the course of his speech, Mamba criticized Pelem and Rubusana 
for reportedly having made speeches on "racial" (i.e. tribal) lines, and. emphasized 
that "we are one - the Idutywa district is the same as this1'. His chasacteristic 
populism surfaced at several points: he criticized Council expenditure on   vain show^^^ 
rather tQan on education; he called for the replacement of whites "getting big 
salariesn in council employment by blacks. The admiring reporter concluded by 
reflecting that "It is a nice thing for a man to be educated, brave, and have natural 
wisdom . . . Men like this one could govern people's affairs, given proper responsibility". 
Conclus ion 
This paper has concentrated on knitting together stray strands of 
biopaphical data so as to provide a coherent account of the political career of Enoch 
Mamba. Yet even a paper so firmly focussed on the life of one man m w  not be wholly 
devoid of wider sigmificance. This is not an apology for a biographical approach: 
rather, let the first conclusion to be drawn from these pages be an asserbion that there 
is room in South African historical writing for biographical investigations. The 
underdeveloped state of South African historiography is such that amongst a wealth of 
sources entire episodes, axeas, and individual lives - as well as processes and 
structures - await discovery, description and. analysis. The appeal is not for 
biography for its own sake. The recovery of individual lives from "the enormous 
condescension of posterity" (24) ought not to be an end in itself for the historian. 
The merit of the exercise lies in the explanatory value yielded up by it: in the 
extent to which the individual's aspirations and activities, conflicts or alliances 
with others, illuminate the social structure in which he or she moved, and how that 
structure promoted or inhibited his or her movements. 
Between roughly 1890 and 1914, the forces bro-t to bear on African 
communities in South Africa intensified and altered. In very general terns, the 
demand for labour rose rapidly; access by black peasants to land was made more 
difficult and more costly; taxes were raised and more efficiently collected; and a 
great deal of attention was paid to the policing and regulating of black communities 
in towns, on farms, and in the "reserves11. After the South African War, the close 
links between these tendencies were formally expressed in the search for a common 
"native policy". This thrust towards a more centralized and more elaborate social 
control saw the property-owning rul ing classes relying increasingly upon state action 
to underpin their interests. If the assault was launched upon a number of salients 
and by various methods, so too was the resistance to it and the forms it took. 
Consciousness of these pressures was indicated by collective actions ranging from 
mm1 uprisings to constitutional appeals to an imperial conscience. In particular, 
these years saw an increasingly active political role by members of an educated 
African petty bourgeoisie, the emergence of a number of "pan-tribal" or nationalist 
political associations, and - through the ideology of Ethiopianism - attempts to 
wrest educational, cultural and religious control from colonial hands. 
It is within this nexus of social developments and conflicts that headman 
Mamba's career must be interpreted. Walshe has characterized the increasing political 
role of the African petty bourgeoisie ("the new elitet1) in the Cape as a "broadening 
of political loyalties and ideologyg1 (25), and Mamba's career illustrates this very 
precisely. His political activities were initially extremely parochial and 
circumscribed; his early years as headman were firmly in the mould of Idutywa's 
I1three communitiesIf politics. Mamba's first public commitment to a community wider 
than the Idulgwa Mfengu was in his opposition to Brownlee~s (allegedly) divisive 
politics. From this adventitious or opportunist start, Mamba moved very rapidly to 
more substantial and more considered exercises in supra-tribal politics. His 
conception of Iliso Lomsi was clearly that of a movement open to all Africans in the 
Transkei, and between 1902 and 1904 he attempted to put this into practice, trying to 
broaden his political base beyond Iduigwa and beyond the Mfengu. In 1903 he rejected 
the protonationalist SANC as unsuited to the needs of the Transkei, but by 1906 had 
moved to participation and leadership in the movement. Mamba arrived at political 
maturity in tern of African unity, and in his final active decade did not deviate 
from the vision of full African participation in a broader polity. 
He resembled other Cape African leaders of his W ,  but was in certain 
respects distinctive. Unlike them, he did not have an urban base, and hence his 
political tactics were likely to be different. It was not merely that he remained 
closely involved in the concerns and problems of the rural Transkei, but his rhetoric 
and political style were decisively not those of Jabavu, Rubusana, or Pelem. When 
Sen. W. E. StavLford toured his constituency in 1909 (to gauge reactions to union) he 
met Namba in Engcobo aYLd penned this unfavoumble reaction in his diary: 
... met Enoch Mamba here in the morning. He gavours 
the Native Congress at Bloemfontein and an appeal to 
the Imperial Government. He is rather of the aggressive 
type of educated native whose attitude is not likely to 
help his people. Better for them I think that they 
should have their white friends to fi&t this 'battle' . (26) 
A striking feature of Mamba's career - which seems to reflect both his 
political base in the Transkei and his preferred tactical approach - is the absence 
of any attempt to fight his political battles through alliances with "white friends". 
Far more than his contemporaries in the SANC and the Cape ANC, Mamba adhered to a 
political line which presupposed the ability of Africans to make their own case - as 
well as the justice of that case. Indeed, in several speeches over a number of years, 
there can be discerned what one mqy anachronistically but conveniently label an 
llAfricanist" theme in Mamba's political utterances. His (1904) sympathy with 
Ethiopianism, his reiterated demands that Africans should replace vasious white 
employees in the Transkei, his pointed rejection of existing authorities (magistrates, 
missionaries and the Council system) as unable to serve African advancement or 
development, are components of this theme, Closely linked with it is a perennial 
insistence upon the value of education, the need for more and qualitatively better 
education. It is perhaps in his accents as a "populist moderniser" that Mamba may 
strike present-dqy students as most interesting, as most distinct from his 
contemporaries, and as a resonant "voice in the Big Houset1. 
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